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Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter:
Judicial Innovations in Sentencing - Are
They Constitutional?
In 1656 a woman was sentenced to be 'whipt at Tauton and
Plymouth on market day.' She was also to be fined and forever
in the future 'to have a Roman B cutt out of ridd cloth and
sewed to her vper garment on her right arm in sight.' This was
for blasphemous words. In 1638 John Davis of Boston was or-
dered to wear a red V 'on his vpermost garment' - which signi-
fied, I fancy, viciousness. In 1636 William Bacon was sentenced
to stand an hour in the pillory wearing 'in publique view' a great
D - for his habitual drunkenness . . . [In 1633] in Boston:
'Robert Coles was fyned ten shillings and enjbyed to stand with
a white sheet of paper on his back whereon Drunkard shalbe
written in great Ires and to stand therewith soe longe as the
Court finde meete, for abusing himself shamfully with drink.'1
I. Introduction
In October, 1975, Windell McDowell was convicted of purse
snatching and was placed on probation with the condition that he
was not to go out of his house unless he was wearing metal taps on
the soles of his shoes.2 In 1978, a man found to have illegally grown
marijuana was ordered to wheel his plant twenty times around the
courthouse in a wheel-barrow for four consecutive Sundays and to
carry a notice proclaiming his belief in the propriety of legalizing the
use of marijuana.3 In May 1985, Ronald Barbone was convicted of
1. A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 88 (1896). The wearing of labels
or letters symbolizing the crime committed is not an American or Puritanical invention. Dat-
ing back to 1364, England enforced such punishments to reprimand rebels, liars and criminals.
Despite the inability of some to read the labels placed upon those sentenced, the message was
quite clear. Id. at 94-95. Other sentences, such as the pillory, stocks, gallows or penance stool,
were often coupled with the scarlet letter. Id. at 90.
2. People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976). The condition
was intended to preclude the defendant from approaching purse snatching victims silently, the
means he used to facilitate his trade. Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843. The defendant argued
that, by imposing this condition, the sentencing court stigmatized him by implying, "You are a
purse snatcher and others must always know of your presence." Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
842-43. The defendant further contended that such a sentence was analogous to placing a sign
"around [his] neck that read, 'I am a thief.' " Id. The appellate court reversed and remanded
the sentencing court's order for clarification as to whether the taps were to be worn only when
leaving the house of at all times outside of his home. Id.
3. Sunday Times, April 14, 1978, cited in N. WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER &
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driving while under the influence of alcohol. The sentencing court
required Barbone to affix to his vehicle special license plates, which
were of a different color than ordinary plates.4 In June 1985, Arthur
Goldschmitt was convicted of driving while under the influence of
alcohol and, in exchange for specified driving privileges, was sen-
tenced to place upon his vehicle a bumper sticker that read "CON-
VICTED DUI - RESTRICTED LICENSE."' 5 In May 1987, Rich-
ard Bateman, upon his second conviction for child molestation, was
required, as a condition of his probation, to place upon the door of
his residence and upon both doors of his vehicle a sign that stated in
three-inch lettering, "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO
CHILDREN ALLOWED."6
This practice of labeling a criminal with symbols or words ex-
positive of the offense committed was used in colonial America as a
form of punishment by humiliation. 7 Penologists, however, later
deemed the method to be an archaic and unacceptable means of
dealing with anti-social behavior, and henceforth courts sent
criminals to correctional institutions.8 Today, faced with the reality
of ineffective9 and overcrowded prisons,' 0 the judiciary has been
STIGMA 144 (1980).
4. State v. Barbone, No. 3653, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1987). The controlling
statutory provision, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231 (Baldwin 1984), provides:
§ 4503.231 Special License Plates for Motor Vehicles Whose Standard
Plates Have Been Impounded.
No motor vehicle . . . of a person whose certificate of registration and iden-
tification license plates have been impounded as provided by division (B) of sec-
tion 4507.38 of the Revised Code, shall be operated or driven on any highway in
this state unless it displays identification license plates which are a different
color from those regularly issued and carry a special serial number that may be
readily identified by law enforcement officers. The registrar of motor vehicles
shall designate the color and serial number to be used on such license plates,
which shall remain the same from year to year and shall not be displayed in any
other motor vehicles.
Id.
5. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) appeal
denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (1986). Defense counsel for Mr. Goldschmitt has expressed his desire
to appeal this issue to the Supreme Court of the United States. 60 Minutes: Titus v. Metcalfe
(ABC television broadcast, February 2, 1986).
6. State v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. filed Dec. 17, 1987). See also State v.
Bateman, 48 Or. App. 357, 616 P.2d 1206 (1980) (involving defendant's first molestation
conviction).
7. L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 5 (1975). See also
A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 88 (1896).
8. See Leiber, The American Prison: A Tinderbox, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84/85 227
(1984).
9. Heijder, Can We Cope With Alternatives?, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, I (1980)
("The correctional institution is supposed to be a people changing agency, yet we doubt
whether prison really persuades offenders to abandon criminal behavior.").
10. Id. at 2. See also Kramer, Forward, 9 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND CIVIL CONFINE-
MENT 230 (1985).
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compelled by the economic needs of society to explore innovative al-
ternatives to incarceration.11 Thus, focusing upon the goals of pun-
ishment1" and the protection of society,1" a minority of judges have
returned to a form of "scarlet letter" sentencing.
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfig-
ured the wearer, - so that both men and women, who had been
familiarly acquainted with Hester Prynne, were now impressed
as if they beheld her for the first time, - was that SCARLET
LETTER, so fantastically embroidered and illuminated upon
her bosom. It had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the
ordinary relations with humanity, and enclosing her in a sphere
by herself.14
Modern-day scarlet letters have stunned the country and drawn na-
tional attention to the various issues surrounding these controversial
sentencing decisions.
1 5
This Comment discusses the evolution of punishment and the
historical attempts made to move away from incarceration as a pri-
mary source of punishment and examines where penology stands to-
day in its search for alternatives. This Comment then analyzes these
scarlet letter sentences in terms of the eighth amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. It explores the effectiveness
of such punishments as practical alternatives to incarceration and
addresses their potential for protecting society. Finally, this Com-
Paradoxically, while we pursue sentencing policies that pack offenders into
prisons through the front door, thirty-one states now under court order to reduce
prison overcrowding are releasing them out the back door. Old and dilapidated
prisons and houses of correction are literally bulging at the seams using single
cells to sleep three or more inmates and utilizing cellers, corridors, and bath-
rooms to line up bunk beds. Rehabilitation and correction is no longer consid-
ered a goal nor even a possibility.
Id.
I1. Id. See also Thompson, Overcrowding Spurs Alternative Sentences, 98 L.A. DAILY
JOURNAL, Nov. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
12. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (1986)
[hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT (articulating the primary goals of punishment as specific deter-
rence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, education and retribution). See also
United States v. Carlson, 562 F. Supp. 181, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (listing the primary
goals of punishment as specific deterrence, general deterrence, restraint and rehabilitation).
13. See Dep't of Health & Social Services v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986)
(stating that the state is required to consider public safety when administering sentencing con-
ditions). See also R. GERBER & P. MCANANY, CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT 4 (1972) (ex-
plaining that the protection of society is the underlying principle of all criminal sanctions.).
14. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 74 (1850).
15. See Silverman, A Modern-Day Scarlet Letter for a Sex Offender, NAT'L L.J. August
31, 1987, at 8, col. I; Scarlet Bumper: Humiliating Drunk Drivers,.TME, June 17, 1985, at
52; Nordheimer, In-House Dispute: Drunken-Driver Bumper Stickers, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1985, at A22, col. 3.
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ment supports the imposition of scarlet letter sentences while urging
that legislative measures be taken to curtail the potential abuses that
could flow from this type of alternative sentencing.
II. Punishment
A. History
Methods of punishment and corrections of criminal offenders
have undergone many changes. These changes denote a correspond-
ing development in morality, economic conditions, and theories of
criminology and penology."6 The criminal justice system has evolved
immensely from the retaliatory punishments of the early Middle
Ages to contemporary methods that focus upon the diagnosis, treat-
ment and rehabilitation of offenders 17 and the education of society."8
Nonetheless, a severe dissatisfaction with the success of treatment
under the theory of rehabilitation has spurred a reacceptance of a
theory that embraces retribution as the principal goal of punish-
ment.'9 Criminal law has, therefore, progressed to a point of coming
full circle, 20 by accepting retribution and punishment as the primary
goals of correctional efforts, themes espoused in the early Victorian
ages."'
In the Middle Ages, punishments focused upon a quid pro quo
mode of justice.22 This system permitted the injured private individ-
ual to impose proportional punitive sanctions upon the person who
caused the injury.2" The injured person or family thereby obtained
the benefit and satisfaction of inflicting the warranted degree of pain
and suffering upon the offender.2 ' Eventually, the public body be-
came responsible for exacting punishment, 5 a shift in roles that oc-
curred as a result of cases in which the injured party or family failed
to survive to administer "justice."2 6 The offender then fell under the
16. See Heijder, supra note 9, at 1.
17. Lopez, The Crime of Criminal Sentencing Based on Rehabilitation, II GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 533, 537-39 (1981); J. SENNA & L. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 376, 393 (1981).
18. Lopez, supra note 17, at 539-41.
19. Richardson, From Retribution to Rehabilitation to Retribution, 36 J. OF MO. BAR
149 (1980) (noting retribution as the principal goal of the criminal justice system in the last
ten years). See also Lieber, supra note 8, at 227.
20. See generally R. GERBER & P. MCANANY, supra note 13, at 25-30.
21. Richardson, supra note 19, at 149.
22. R. GERBER & P. McANANY, supra note 13, at 26.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 26-38.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id.
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King's mercy. 7 This shift effected a change in focus from the need
of the injured individual to gain personal satisfaction to the need of
society to condemn anti-social behavior.2 8
Despite this evolution from private to public justice, however,
retribution remained the primary justification for punishment.29
Thus, British justice of the era included branding, lashing, ear crop-
ping and expulsion to penal colonies 30 In addition, hundreds of mi-
nor crimes such as petty theft could be punished by death in this
era.
3 1
The earliest reformers, Quakers,32 developed a novel approach33
to punishment in the late 1700s.11 Believing that solitude would en-
able offenders to see their errors, repent and reform, 35 they created
separate cells for confinement. 6 The Quakers required no work of
the prisoners, since they were to occupy their time by studying the
Bible. 7 The Quakers released prisoners when society regarded them
as being sufficiently reformed.3 8 Society viewed this penitentiary sys-
tem as an effective means of dealing with offenders, and the system
later became the predominant method in America as well as Europe
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.39 This form of punish-
ment encouraged the theory of rehabilitation," which became the
primary goal of punishment in the early 1900s."'
By 1935, a majority of states, in response to this goal, adopted
indeterminate sentencing structures."2 Indeterminate sentencing ac-
cords the sentencing judge broad discretion 43 in order to individual-
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 28-30.
29. Id.
30. Lieber, supra note 8, at 230.
31. Id.
32. A Quaker was a member of the religious Society of Friends. Literally, "Quaker"
means to "tremble at the word of the Lord." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE 1067 (1967).
33. This approach was novel because, up until this time, punishment usually involved the
receiving of pain or suffering.
34. Lieber, supra note 8, at 230; see also Lopez, supra note 17, at 538.




39. Lieber, supra note 8, at 230; see also Lopez, supra note 17, at 538.
40. Incarceration is thought to stimulate a behavioral change. Heijder, supra note 9, at
3.
41. Lopez, supra note 17, at 539-41.
42. Id.
43. Lopez, supra note 17, at 539-41. Judicial discretion is presently under considerable
scrutiny, as few persons are satisfied with the degree of discretion provided. There are, how-
ever, sharp divisions as to what reforms are desirable. J. ISRAEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (1979).
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ize treatment." ' In determining an appropriate sentence, a judge is
permitted to evaluate a variety of factors, such as mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and past behavior. The judge is also able
to consider his own intuition as to the offender's potential for social
conformity. 5 Such a structure prevents two defendants who are
charged with the same statutory violation but who committed the
violations in very different manners from being treated exactly
alike."' In each case, indeterminate sentencing allows the judge to
take all the relevant circumstances into account and to provide an
appropriately-tailored sentence."7
Under this theory of rehabilitation, therapeutic treatments are
provided to those offenders who do not require or would not be
benefitted from incarceration."' In the mid 1900s, the penal system
developed probation and parole systems to prevent any adverse af-
fects of incarceration or long-term incarceration."9 Both programs
were geared toward discovering the underlying psychological motiva-
tions behind the criminal behavior and modifying the behavior to
conform with societal expectations. ° Society viewed the programs'
high cost as justified if recidivism could in fact be reduced.51
During the 1970s, several studies condemned these rehabilita-
tion efforts as having little or no effect on recidivism.52 Critics urged
Federal and state statutes provide trial courts with broad discretion when imposing a sen-
tence, and each judge perceives his realm of discretion differently. The judge's own back-
ground and experience, as well as morality, may affect sentencing decisions. In total, a judge
may consider as many as 205 factors in making sentencing decisions. Fleet, Sentencing the
Criminal - a Judicial Responsibility, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 369, 371-72 (1986).
"Appellate review of probation conditions generally has been limited to cases of clear
abuse of discretion." Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of
Discretion?, 53 FORD. L. REV. 637, 648 (1982). Severe or unusual probation terms have been
drawing close scrutiny from the courts to avoid equal protection violations. See, e.g., United
States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338, 340 (3rd Cir. 1982); United States v. Pastor, 537 F.2d 675,
681 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
Probation conditions "must be narrowly drawn to achieve rehabilitation and protection of the
public without unnecessarily restricting the probationer's otherwise lawful activities." Hidgon
v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980).
44. Fleet, supra note 43, at 372. Some critics suggest that the individualization of
sentences is crucial to the prevention of crime and the correction of its effects, as well as to the
administration of justice.
45. Id. at 370-71.
46. J. Israel, supra note 43, at 12. For example, a kidnapping in which a divorced parent
takes a child from the other parent's custody without permission is vastly different from a
kidnapping in which a child is snatched by a stranger for ransom money. Id.
47. Id. See also Fleet, supra note 43, at 372.
48. Lieber, supra note 8, at 230.
49. Lopez, supra note 17, at 539.
50. Kramer, supra note 10, at 320-21.
51. Id.
52. A recidivist is "a habitual criminal; a criminal repeater. An incorrigible criminal.
One who makes a trade of crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (5th ed. 1979). See also
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that the extended prison terms imposed in the name of rehabilitation
resulted only in the overcrowding of correctional institutions.53 Fur-
thermore, they emphasized incarceration's shocking rate of failure as
a tool for reform. They suggest that, by their very nature, prisons
ensure these failures." "Mass living and bureaucratic management
of large numbers of human beings are counter-productive to the
goals of positive behavior change and reintegration."5 Finally, there
is the problem of overcrowding. Prisons have evolved into a billion-
dollar-a-year institution unable to combat the need for growth."6
Building new facilities is economically unfeasible for the government
and will provide only temporary relief.
57
Such criticism has inspired legislatures to adopt determinate
sentencing structures,58 which provide for definite prison terms and
cause the abandonment of programs designated to further rehabilita-
tion.59 Under a determinate structure, prisoners are released from
facilities after their sentence has been served, regardless of their
mental condition.60 This sentencing structure reflects a return in
thinking to the classical theory of retribution as a primary goal of
punishment.61 The prisoner must pay his penance, after which time
he is released. The determinate sentencing scheme reduces spending
but places an inordinate reliance on the prison systems.62 Under such
a scheme, there is no incentive for the prisoner to seek help.6"
Lopez, supra note 17, at 551-75 (finding inherent weaknesses in the theory that prisoners can
be rehabilitated through psychological, vocational, or moral rehabilitation and arguing that the
criminal justice system, had it recognized these defects earlier, could have avoided pointless
programs carried out in the name of rehabilitation). But see Clanon, Rehabilitation was
Working, 2 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 13 (1982) (arguing that sentencing not geared toward reha-
bilitation has resulted in a greater recidivism rate in California).
53. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 8, at 230.
54. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS 597 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Smith, Bubinzer & Holmes, An Alternative to Traditional Offender Sentencing: The
Task Sentence - A Performance Contingent Model, 9 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. CONFINEMENT
343 (1983). The average cost to house a prisoner ranged from $25,000 to $30,000 a year per
prisoner in 1982. During that same year, thirty-one states were under court order to reduce
prison overcrowding. Ironically then, while judges send criminals to jail through the front door,
they also let them out through the back door. Kramer, supra note 10, at 320.
57. Kramer, supra note 10, at 320. "Construction costs average 72,000 a bed, but with
interest on bonds and loans the real cost is about 200,000." Id., citing K. SCHOEN & S. GET-
TINGER, OVER CROWDED TIME - WHY PRISONS ARE So CROWDED AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE 22 (1982).
58. Lopez, supra note 17, at 541-43. See also CLANON, supra note 52, at 13.
59. Lieber, supra note 19, at 229.
60. N. WALKER, PUNISHMENT DANGER STIGMA 24 (1980).
61. Id.
62. Kramer, supra note 10, at 319.
63. See Lopez, supra note 17, at 544.
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[The prisoner's] knowledge that he may be restrained only
for a definite period is in many instances the rock on which our
plans split. "The Judge gave me ten years. I can do that stand-
ing on my head," a prisoner once said to me. But if the judge
had been able to say not less than ten years and as much longer
as seems necessary, we should have witnessed a different reac-
tion on his part."4
Because of the attitude assumed by prisoners, the threat of incarcer-
ation has not been a successful deterrent to crime.65 Critics therefore
believe that the recidivism rate may continue to climb under a sen-
tencing system based upon retribution.6
B. Historical Innovations
Historically, reforms have been successful in their attempts to
provide creative alternatives to the purely punitive forms of punish-
ment.67 In the 1840s, Maconochie introduced the mark system,6 8
which was first utilized in a British penal colony at Norfolk Island. 9
This program consisted of three various stages of development: the
penal, the mark and the social stages. 70 The penal stage entailed sep-
arate confinement, meals consisting solely of bread and water, and
moral teachings. During the mark stage, the offender was permitted
to associate with others and granted more freedom.71 In the final
stage, the offender was permitted to associate freely with the other
inmates. A prisoner achieved elevation to the various stages by his
voluntary participation in therapy and improvement in social con-
formity, for which he earned marks.72 If the offender chose to do
nothing to rehabilitate himself, he remained at stage one. 73 To be
released, however, he had to surpass stages two and three. Because
of Maconochie's belief in social pressure, officials in the colony fig-
ured the earned marks of each individual by averaging the daily pro-
ductivity of the group as a whole. Such a procedure used peer pres-
sure constructively to encourage reform and prevented it from
64. Id. (citing J. MITFORD, KIND AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 79 (1973)).
65. Heijder, supra note 9, at 1-2. The author believes that prisons have become society's
dumping grounds for undesirables.
66. See Clanon, supra note 52, at 13.
67. Smith, Bubinzer & Holmes, supra note 56, at 344.
68. Id. See generally A. MACONOCHIE, GENERAL VIEWS REGARDING THE SOCIAL SYS-
TEM OF CONVICT MANAGEMENT (1939).






serving a destructive role in thwarting the desire to participate in
therapy.7"
This system, along with Crofton's "Irish System" and Brock-
way's ideological contributions, was extinguished by political tur-
moil.75 Unfortunately, these methods would provide little to alleviate
the present problem facing American corrections. Because they re-
lied heavily upon incarceration, these methods would tend to contrib-
ute to prison overcrowding rather than provide an alternative that
does not involve incarceration as a primary component of the
sentence.
Like the prison system, probation and parole departments also
suffer from overburdening, possibly as the result of attempts to alle-
viate prison overcrowding."' For example, overcrowding in local pris-
ons required emergency action in New York City in 1982. In re-
sponse to a federal order that addressed overcrowded prison
conditions, six-hundred-ten prisoners were released on parole. 7 Fur-
ther, the clientele growth of probation departments has surpassed
both prison and parole population rates."'
The increased reliance on probation has stirred much debate.
Supporters argue that probation and parole can reduce crime by re-
forming criminals and can cut costs and prison overcrowding by re-
leasing low-risk offenders.79 Unfortunately, penologists have found
that only three percent of those criminals currently being sentenced
to prison could be considered low-risk,80 and releasing only three per-
cent of the prison population is hardly sufficient to solve the over-
crowding dilemma.81 Thus, by necessity, moderate-risk offenders as
well as low-risk offenders are being released from correctional
institutions.
82
Critics contend that society cannot continue to release these
dangerous criminals and still enjoy its notion of a free and safe soci-
ety.83 Therefore, concerned individuals have proposed various alter-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Petersilia, Community Supervision: Trends and Critical Issues, 31 CRIME AND DE-
LINQUENCY 339-40 (1985).
77. Taylor, Reform Attempts Lead to Increase in Prison Terms, L.A. DAILY J. Dec. 28,
1983, at 1, col. 6.
78. Petersilia, supra note 76, at 339-40.
79. Id. at 341.
80. Id. at 344.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Kramer, supra note 10, at 320.
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natives to incarceration. 8' Such innovative methods include: house
arrest, 5 intensive supervision probation,8 earn-it programs,"' and
others. 88 These programs have the potential to be successful because
they represent an "intermediate" type of sentence. While not as se-
vere as prison, they are more controlled and supervised than tradi-
tional probation or parole.
C. Contemporary Innovations
In their search for safe and effective alternatives, sentencing
courts have also turned to "scarlet-letter" sentences. For example, in
1985, two common pleas judges in Sarasota County, Florida, devised
a program whereby convicted drunken drivers89 could be punished
by orders requiring them to affix, to their vehicles, bumper stickers
that read "CONVICTED DUI - RESTRICTED LICENSE." 0
This program, which has gained national attention,91 enabled a per-
son whose driver's license has been suspended because of driving
while under the influence of alcohol to request a restricted license. 92
The license allows the offender to drive for business purposes only,
provided he places the sticker on his vehicle, completes a substance
abuse course,'93 pays a fine and court costs,94 and performs commu-
84. Id.
85. See Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of An Intermediate Level Penal
Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1987).
86. See Petersilia, supra note 76, at 339.
87. Kramer, supra note 10, at 321.
88. Judges have also opted to provide stringent standards for criminals to follow while
on probation. See United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1186 (4th Cir. 1976) (offender
forbidden to attend racetrack); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975) (offender forbidden to attend Irish organizational
meetings); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (offender forbid-
den to associate with homosexuals); Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir.
1963) (offender forbidden to engage in repossession business); 7 NAT'L L.J., April I, 1985, at
43; 7 NAT'L L.J., November 26, 1984, at 47; 7 NAT'L L.J., November 19, 1984, at 47; 6 NAT'L
L.J., April 9, 1984, at 43; 6 NAT'L L.J., March 19, 1984, at 51.
89. Drunken drivers are chosen as subjects for the program because of the mounting
offenses and societal dissatisfaction with the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Telephone
interview with William I. Munsey, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Sarasota County, Florida
(Sept. 14, !988).
90. Brief for Appellant at 1, Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant, Goldschmitt]. See also Note, The Bumper Sticker:
The Innovation that Failed, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 643 (1988).
91. See generally Scarlet Bumper, supra note 15, at 52; Nordheimer, supra note 15, at
A22, col. 3.
92. Brief for Appellant, Goldschmitt, supra note 90, at 1.
93. Id. Those convicted of violating Florida drunken driving provisions are required to
attend and complete a substantive abuse course specified by the court. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
316.193 (West Supp. 1986).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(2)(a)(l)(a) (West Supp. 1986) ("Any person who is
convicted of a violation of subsection (I) shall be punished by a fine of (a) not less than $250
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nity service.95 The defendant is thus given the choice of applying the
bumper sticker to his vehicle and driving with restrictions or of being
sentenced under the traditional sentencing guidelines of the offense. 96
The Salvation Army Department of Corrections,97 which over-
sees all misdemeanor probations in Sarasota County, monitors the
entire program." Within hours of obtaining a Business Purposes
Only sticker, defendants must report to the Salvation Army.99 A Sal-
vation Army officer then supervises the placement and maintenance
of this sticker from that point until the end of the probationary
period. 1°0
Defendants have objected to the bumper sticker program on two
separate grounds: the first amendment right to free speech 0 1 and the
eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.102
Nonetheless, the trial courts issuing these stickers have adhered to
their original position that the stickers are constitutional, as the least
restrictive means of protecting the safety, health and welfare of the
community.103
The Second District Court of Appeals of Florida has affirmed
the trial courts' sentencing action.104 The Florida Supreme Court has
declined to accept jurisdiction over these cases and thus allowed the
sentencing procedure to stand. 05 Presently, defendants are report-
or more than $500 for a first conviction.").
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(6)(a) (West Supp. 1986).
96. Transcript of Proceedings, Goldschmitt v. State, No. 85-1649 at 6. Judge Titus ex-
plained the terms of probation to the defendant as:
If you do not wish to drive for business purposes you do not have to have
that bumper sticker attached to your car. It will not be made part of your per-
son. It will not be displayed on your face, your body or any other part of you. It
will be placed on your car only if you wish to drive for business purposes only.
Id. The County Court has found that the bumper sticker requirement constitutes a special
condition of probation permitted under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(4) (1985).




101. See Brief for Appellant, Goldschmitt, supra note 91, at 3. Defendant claimed that
by forcing him to affix the sign on his car, he was being forced to speak against his will in
violation of his first amendment right to free speech. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (a Jehovah's witness could not be forced to reveal the New Hampshire motto on
his license plates "Live free or die"). But see Porter v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir.
1971) (probation condition may limit association with "groups that would palpably encourage
[the offender] to repeat his criminal conduct"); People v. Arvanities, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1052,
1062, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 499 (1971) (condition may prohibit certain activities that ordinarily
receive first amendment protection).
102. See Brief for Appellant, Goldschmitt, supra note 90, at 3. See also supra note 91
and accompanying text.
103. Transcript of Proceedings, Goldschmitt, supra note 7, at 6.
104. Id.
105. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), appeal denied,
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edly seeking certiorari on the issue with the Supreme Court of the
United States.10 6
Similarly, in May 1987, a trial judge in Portland, Oregon, sus-
pended Richard J. Bateman's prison sentence in return for his prom-
ise to comply with another novel punishment. 07 Oregon State Dis-
trict Judge Dorothy M. Baker imposed on the twice-convicted child
molester a sentence that allowed him to live in the community, but
required him to post a sign on the front door of his residence and on
both sides of his vehicle.' This sign read: "DANGEROUS SEX
OFFENDER, NO CHILDREN ALLOWED." These signs contain
a judicially-mandated lettering of three inches.'0 9
Although upon each conviction of separate child molestation
charges Mr. Bateman had declared he would not repeat his of-
fense, 110 Judge Baker experienced doubts and imposed additional
conditions upon his release."' She ordered that Bateman not live
within ten blocks of his previous residence."' She declared public
places where children might be found, such as zoos, parks and play-
grounds, off-limits to him." 3 Finally, in addition to payment of a fine
and attendance at a sex offenders treatment program," 4 Judge
Baker ordered Bateman to hang the controversial sign throughout
his five-year term of probation."'
Commenting on her innovative sentence, Judge Baker suggested
that she had no other choice but to impose this unique sentencing
496 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986).
106. 60 Minutes: Titus v. Metcalfe (ABC television broadcast, February 2, 1986).
107. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Oregon Ct. App. filed
November 11, 1987) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant, Bateman].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 12.
Mr. Bateman: "I'm going to go out and start my life over again, and I'm
not going to have anything to do with anybody."
The Court: "You're not going to do this to children anymore?"
Mr. Bateman: "No, ma'am."
The Court: "Isn't that the same promise you made last time?"
Id.
11. Id. at 7.
The Court: "[molesting small children is a sex offender's] way of life. They
seem to think it's their right to be able to engage in this behavior. Treatment is
only successful during the period of time that they are on treatment. If they are
gone from treatment for two weeks, they are back reoffending."
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 6-7. Further conditions of probation included submission to polygraphs and
breath, urine and anal analysis. He was not to consume non-presc'iption drugs or alcohol and
was to maintain full-time employment. Id. at 7.
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arrangement. 1 6 Faced with the limited space in Oregon's prisons,
she predicted that the defendant would be released within weeks of
his conviction if he were incarcerated." 7 After such an early release
from prison, officials would have no way of monitoring Bateman's
activities, and Bateman, an alcoholic with a history of sexual of-
fenses and anti-social behavior, was not a good risk to impose upon
society after such a short time, with no limit on his activities.",
Although the prosecuting attorney enthusiastically supported
the Judge's order," 9 others were displeased by this sentence. 20 The
defendant is currently appealing this case to the Oregon Court of
Appeals on the basis that the sentence is unconstitutional in several
aspects.' Primarily, Bateman argues that this sentence violates his
eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
treatment.'22
II. The Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment first ap-
peared in early English documents. 23 The Magna Carta 24 con-
tained a provision that permitted punishment only "in proportion to
the measure of the offense."' 2 5 This declaration was later codified in
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated: "Excessive bail
might not be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."' 26 Nonetheless, harsh penalties con-
tinued in that country.' 27
116. Id.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id.
119. Silverman, supra note 15, at 8.
120. Id. Harvard Law School professor Arthur R. Miller has argued that the signs are
nothing more than "a quick and dirty method that exemplifies a breakdown in the criminal
justice system." Id. See also Brief filed Amicus Curiae, State v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Oreg.
Ct. App. filed November il, 1987) (filed by National Civil Liberties Union).
121. Telephone interview with Mr. Richard E. Fowlks, Counsel for Bateman at the trial
court level (Sept. 14, 1988).
122. Brief for Appellant, Bateman, supra note 107, at 6. Bateman also contended that
his right to privacy had been violated as well as his right to free speech. Id.
123. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 3.
124. THE MAGNA CARTA (1215).
125. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 3.
126. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 40-46 (1971);
Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 839, 852 (1969). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
127. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 3-4. As late as 1792, the English Parliament invested
judges with the power to order the dissecting and gibbeting of a murderer. Id. at 3. Gibbeting
was the act of hanging a criminal in public view from a T-shaped structure. AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 555 (1980). Gibbeting and hanging in chains,
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Corporal punishment in the American colonies was milder and
varied from the methods utilized in England. 12 8 There were few re-
ported cases of men being broken on the wheel and little documenta-
tion of any significant number of persons being dissected, boiled, gib-
beted or pressed to death. American colonists instead preferred to
impose sanctions of humiliation or public indignation as a method of
punishment. 12 9 Thus, devices such as the pillory, stocks, scarlet let-
ter, ducking stool, whipping post and public penance were common
in colonial America. Such punishments were community spectacles
and always well-attended. 10
A new mark in the development of rights against cruel and un-
usual punishment in America, began with the drafting of the federal
Bill of Rights3 1 in 1789,132 which included a provision stating that
"[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' 3 This cruel and un-
usual punishment clause was a replica of that contained in the En-
glish Bill of Rights, 34 except that the "might not" contained in the
English Bill of Rights was replaced with "shall not."' 35 This varia-
tion has left doubt in the minds of judges as to what standards are to
apply in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual. 3
There are few standard guidelines and "the Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the concept of cruel and unusual punishment is
constantly changing.' 37 In Weems v. United States,'38 for example,
as well as burning women at the stake, is reported to have continued well into the 1790s. Id. at
4. See also L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 209-13 (1948). By
1965, nearly all brutal methods of punishment were abolished by the English Parliament.
128. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 5.
129. Id. at 4-5; see also A. EARLE, supra note 1, at 1-118.
130. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 5.
131. Id. James Madison, the drafter of the Federal Bill of Rights, used the Virginia
Declaration of Rights as a model for the cruel and unusual punishment section of the Bill. The
Virginia Declaration of Rights was based on the English Bill of Rights. Id.




136. As Chief Justice Burger stated in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972)
(Burger, J., dissenting), "From every indication, the Framers of the Eighth Amendment in-
tended to give the phrase a meaning far different from that of its English precursor." Justice
Marshall pointed out in his concurring opinion that the concept of cruel and unusual punish-
ment was intended to be read quite broadly, and the founding fathers meant to prohibit not
only torture but other inhumane punishments. Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., concurring).
137. L. BERKSON, supra note 7, at 15. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), in which the defendant was sentenced to 15 years in prison along with accessory penal-
ties for false entries in a public document. The court found that the punishment inflicted an
excessive penalty for such a minor crime. The court held that the "cruel and unusual" clause
of the Constitution was not "fastened to the obsolete but may require meaning as public opin-
ion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378. See generally Note, The Effect of
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Justice McKenna stated: "Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth."13' He advanced this theory by further noting that the cruel
and unusual clause "may acquire meaning as, public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice."'""
Lower courts, however, demanded an applicable, objective stan-
dard, and thus developed several tests. A few state courts maintained
a simple, flexible standard. They considered punishment cruel and
unusual if it "shocked the conscience of reasonable men."'' There
were problems of ambiguity and subjectivity with this approach,
therefore the Supreme Court espoused a more workable test in
Furman v. Georgia.
142
In Furman, three separate defendants received the death pen-
alty; one for the crime of murder and two for crimes of rape. The
majority held that "the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.' 14 In the con-
curring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong
probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially re-
jected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to be-
lieve that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some
less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that pun-
ishment violates the command of the clause that the state may
not inflict inhumane and uncivilized punishments upon those
convicted of crimes.'4
Justice Brennan thus divided his theory into four primary ques-
tions, which will be grouped in pairs for the purposes of this Com-
ment. They are as follows: 1) Is the punishment unacceptable to con-
temporary society or so degrading to human dignity as to cause the
Rhodes v. Chapman on the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 ARK. L.
REV. 731 (1982).
138. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
139. Id. at 373, cited in, L. BERKSEN, supra note 7, at 15.
140. Id. at 378, cited in L. BERKSEN, supra note 7, at 15. This philosophy was still
followed by the Court forty-eight years later. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.").
141. See, e.g., State v. Teague, 215 Or. 609, 611, 336 P.2d 338, 340 (1959). See also L.
BERKSEN, supra note 7, at 15.
142. 408 U.S. 238 (1972), cited in, L. BERKSEN, supra note 7, at 15.
143. Id. at 239-40.
144. Id. at 282.
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offender mental anguish? 2) Is the punishment arbitrarily inflicted
or excessive in relation to the offense committed?" 5
Judges may give varying weight and credence to the criteria set
out by Justice Brennan. If we apply these standards to the punish-
ments utilized today, some sentences may undoubtedly be constitu-
tionally suspect. Under these guidelines, warning signs such as those
used in Bateman and Goldschmitt, however, do not violate the
eighth amendment."
A. Is the Punishment Unacceptable to Contemporary Society or
So Degrading to Human Dignity as to Cause Mental Anguish?
Scarlet letter-type sentences are not unacceptable to contempo-
rary society or so degrading to human dignity as to cause mental
anguish. These warning signs imposed upon offenders are not the
same as being forcibly marched to the scaffold and shackled to the
public pillory. 47 The differences between the degrading physical rig-
ors of the pillory and a sign, which in some cases is voluntarily
elected 4" by the offender in return for certain privileges, are unmis-
takable. Unlike the scarlet A worn by Hester Prynne'4 9 or the letters
worn by those guilty of crimes in the 1600s to 1700s, 50 these signs
serve a useful and practical purpose. Public drunkenness and adul-
tery, common crimes in the colonial America that received scarlet
letters as punishment,' 5' are not crimes that threaten the public well-
being. The letters, therefore, were placed upon those people for the
sole purpose of humiliating the offender. Such a practice would be
offensive to contemporary society and therefore cruel and unusual
punishment under the Brennan standard announced in Trop.152
145. Id. at 257-305, developed in, L. BERKSEN, supra note 7, at 15.
146. These sentences have been attacked on first amendment, fifth amendment and
eighth amendment bases. This Comment is concerned solely with the eighth amendment issue.
147. See generally Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 32 N.E. 1019 (1893); State v. Moilan,
140 Minn. 112, 167 N.W. 345 (1918). See also Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107,
at 29.
148. Bateman's condition of probation was not elected on a voluntary basis. The judge
imposed the sign as a mandatory term of his probation. The imposition of probation as a
whole, however, was not mandatory and could have been refused. If refused, however, Mr.
Bateman would have then faced incarceration. Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107, at
13 ("If you wish to give up probation that's your choice but that is a term of your proba-
tion."). Goldschmitt had the choice of affixing the sign to his car and thereby receiving re-
stricted driving privileges, or not placing the sign on his car and receiving six months license
suspension. Transcript of Proceedings, Goldschmitt, supra note 103, at 6.
149. N. HAWTHORNE. THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
150. See generally, A. EARLE, supra note 1, at 88 (1986).
151. Id.
152. 356 U.S. 86 (1985). In Trop, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute that
authorized denationalization as a punishment for desertion from the United States military
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The scarlet letters used today are very different than those used
in the past. Their primary purpose is not to humiliate or draw public
ridicule but rather to protect potential victims by warning them of
the danger these offenders pose. Undoubtedly, an unfavorable stigma
attaches to those who bear such a warning. These signs, however, are
the least restrictive alternative to incarceration.
When the court in Trop spoke of punishments inconsistent with
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of matur-
ing society,"' 15 3 it referred to the imposition of extreme punishments,
such as unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or emotional dis-
tress, unusually extensive incarceration, and involuntary expatria-
tion. 54 Courts have found that punishments as extreme as death sur-
vive eighth amendment analysis when the offense is severe enough to
warrant this punishment.1 5 Thus, one who challenges scarlet letter
sentences under the same theory trivializes the cruel and unusual
clause, by suggesting that it precludes a judge from imposing a
warning sign upon a dangerous criminal in the interest of protecting
society but allows, nevertheless, for the death penalty.156
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found in United States
v. William Andersen Co., 57 "the deterrent, and thus the rehabilita-
tive effect of punishment results if it 'inflicts disgrace and contumely
in a dramatic and spectacular manner.' "5' The Court further rea-
soned that "measures are effective which have the impact of the
'scarlet letter' described by Nathanial Hawthorne or the English
equivalent of 'wearing papers' in the vicinity of Westminster Hall
like a sandwich-man's sign describing the culprit's transgressions."'5 9
Although innovative sentences could be carried to extremes that
would offend constitutional standards,' 60 providing a dangerous of-
forces. The punishment of denationalization was "cruel and unusual" because it was outside
traditional penalties. Id. at 101.
153. Id. at 101.
154. Id; see also Brief for Appellee Bateman, supra note 107, at 34.
155. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). It is well settled, through these cases, that the death
penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth
amendment.
156. See Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107, at 34.
157. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 19-.) (affirming sentences for corporate defendants found
guilty of antitrust provisions to brief periods of incarceration, community service, and fines).
158. Id. at 913.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Bienz v. State, 343 So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (probationary
halfway house supervisor ordered the defendant to wear diapers over his regular clothing as
punishment for immature behavior).
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fender with the alternative of wearing a warning sign as opposed to
complying with a statutorily imposed sentence does not create such
an extreme. For example, in Bateman and Goldschmitt, the sentenc-
ing judge did not demand that the sign become any part of the of-
fender's clothing or person.161 Rather, the sentence imposed in each
case was the least restrictive alternative to incarceration and was less
severe in its restrictions of liberty than that allowable under the law.
Thus, because these sentences do provide a public service and are not
purely degrading in nature, they are acceptable to contemporary so-
ciety. 62 That public acceptance may be further encouraged by the
recognition of the need to develop alternatives to incarceration that
will protect society while being economically feasible. 63 Further-
more, these sentences offer legitimate answers to this pressing di-
lemma and are not simply an embarrassment to the offender. They
are thus not so degrading that they cause mental anguish.
B. Is the Punishment Arbitrary or Excessive In Relation to the
Offense Committed?
Unique sentences are not necessarily arbitrary. As the court
noted in People v. McDowell,6 " "merely because a [probation] con-
dition is out of the ordinary does not make it constitutionally unrea-
sonable." 6' As long as the punishment is potentially available to all
similar offenders, it is not an arbitrary punishment.""6 Judges need
not give all similar offenses the same sanction. A judge should in-
stead consider the offender's past record and the offense committed,
as well as any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and fash-
ion a sentence appropriate for the individual offender. Thus, arbi-
trariness is assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Florida's bumper sticker program is not arbitrary because the
option to participate in the program is extended to all first-time DUI
offenders appearing before Judge Titus and Judge De Furia.167 The
docket of the Sarasota County Court in Florida is administered by
161. Transcript of Proceedings, Goldschmitt, supra note 90, at 6 ("[The bumper
sticker] will not be made part of your person. It will not be displayed on your face, your body
or any other party of you. It will be placed on your car only if you wish to drive for business
purposes only.").
162. Id.
163. KRAMER, supra note 10, at 320.
164. 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
165. Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
166. Id.
167. 60 Minutes: Metcalfe v. Titus (CBS television broadcast, February 2, 1986).
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alphabet.'' The first letter of an accused's last name determines
before which judge he or she will appear.16 9 Each judge has the au-
thority to apply sentencing conditions, which include participation in
the bumper sticker program, as long as the conditions conform with
applicable statutes."'
Judge Baker of the Oregon District Court, in imposing the sign
sentences, also acted within her realm of discretion. The conditions
she imposed upon Richard Bateman, the convicted child molester,
were not arbitrary. In the interest of society, she opted to suspend his
prison sentence and place him on special terms of probation.1 ' Ore-
gon law gives judges broad discretion to allow for individualized
sentences that are both appropriate for the individual and in the best
interest of society.17 2 The fact that not all child molesters convicted
in Oregon will receive the punishment given to Bateman does not
render his sentence arbitrary. Judge Baker, however, did imply that
she planned to use a similar sentence with all child molesters.'
73
In Coker v. Georgia,7 4 the Supreme Court clarified the concept
of excessive punishment. An unconstitutionally excessive punishment
exists when the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the offense or when the punishment does not contribute to the
acceptable goals of punishment. 75 In Coker, the Supreme Court
found that a Georgia statute that provided that a person convicted of
rape could be sentenced to death constituted excessive punish-
ment.176 While recognizing that rape is a serious crime, the Court
declared that "the death penalty, which is unique in its severity and
irrevocability, is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such and




Like the death penalty, a scarlet letter sentence can be consid-
ered excessive only after one considers the gravity of the offense
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. Judge Titus presides over all people whose last name begins with the letter "G"
through "N". Judge De Furia receives those cases with the letter "A" through "F." The re-
maining last names beginning with "0" through "Z" are handled by the county court's third
judge, who does not utilize the bumper sticker program. Id.
170. Id.
171. Sentencing conditions in Oregon need only be reasonably related to the offense or
to the needs of an effective probation. E.g., State v. Martin, 282 Or. 583, 580 P.2d 536 (1978).
172. OR. Rev. STAT. § 137.010(l) (1971) placed an obligation upon a sentencing court
"to pass sentence in accordance with this section unless otherwise specifically provided by
law." Id.
173. Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107, at 7-8.
174. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
175. Id. at 592.
176. Id. at 585.
177. Id.
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committed. Thus, the first Coker criterion - gravity of the offense
- must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
The second Coker criterion declares a punishment excessive if it
"makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering."' 78 Coker further explains that
these eighth amendment considerations should be based upon objec-
tive factors.7 9 Important in this analysis is what society considers to
be acceptable goals of punishment. 8 The scarlet letter sentences of
the past were purely humiliating in effect. While they may have cre-
ated a specific deterrent for the offender, they more probably served
only to instill in the offender contempt and disrespect for the judicial
system. Thus, scarlet letter sentences of the past did not contribute
to an acceptable goal of punishment and would violate the cruel and
unusual clause. Scarlet letter sentences of today, however, do further
the goals of punishment and thus satisfy the Coker standard for con-
stitutionally acceptable punishments.
1. Acceptable Goals of Punishment.-The purpose of criminal
laws is to encourage members of society to act in a socially accept-
able manner and to prevent conduct that is undesirable.' 8' Because
the criminal justice system punishes offensive behavior rather than
encouraging proper behavior, its emphasis is on crime prevention.' 82
The threat of punishment furthers prevention.' 83 There are a number
of acceptable goals of punishment. The acceptable goals of punish-
ment have been recognized to include the following: specific deter-
rence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, education, incapacitation
and retribution. 84 If scarlet letter sentences further no acceptable
goal, the imposition of such sentences is unconstitutionally excessive
under the Coker standard.
85
(a). Specific Deterrence.-Specific deterrence is the delib-
erate threat of punishment with the purpose of discouraging antiso-
178. Id. at 592.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5. See also G. SCHEDLER, BEHAV-
IOR MODIFICATION AND "PUNISHMENT" OF THE INNOCENT: TOWARDS A JUSTIFICATION OF THE
INSTITUTE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1978).
182. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5.
183. Id.
184. Id. See also United States v. Carlson, 562 F. Supp. 181, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
185. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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cial or unacceptable conduct. 186 This theory of punishment aims at
deterring a particular offender from repeating his criminal conduct
or from committing any further crimes. 8 This goal is accomplished
by providing the offender with a punishment that he would not
choose to endure a second time. 188 Common sense dictates that the
more severe a penalty, the more likely that the offender will refrain
from that conduct. Thus, whenever society is alarmed about a cer-
tain crime or rate of recidivism, there is a great demand to increase
the severity of the punishment.'89 This is evident in the current soci-
etal demand for harsher penalties for drug traffickers and drunk
drivers.' 90
Penologists, however, have found that the severity of the punish-
ment is not necessarily what influences offenders to refrain from
committing further crimes. Rather, it is the certainty or objective
probability of being convicted.' 9 ' In this regard, the scarlet letter
sentence may prove to be very effective. As a result of his publicly
posted sign, the Oregon sex offender may rightfully believe that local
police are aware of his past offense and will be closely monitoring his
conduct. The scarlet letter-type sentence, unlike incarceration or pro-
bation, does not let the offender conceal his criminal history. His
offense is publicized clearly and, therefore, the probability of this
offender committing a similar undetected offense in the same com-
munity is quite small. Therefore, the objective probability of his be-
ing arrested and convicted, should that offender return to a criminal
lifestyle, is quite high. The scarlet letter penalty thus is a persuasive
deterrent against committing another crime.
(b). General Deterrence.-General deterrence is quite
186. N. WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER, STIMGA, THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 65 (1980). Compare footnotes 186-216 with Note, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation
that Failed, 22 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 643, 661-70 (1988) The author of the note directly opposes
the view espoused in this Comment.
187. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra not 12, at § 1.5.
188. Id. Critics contend that the theory of punishment is ineffective, as evidenced by the
high rate of recidivism among those that have been punished. Others refute these doubts by
stating that the rate of recidivism would be greater if there were no punishments aimed at
specific deterrence. Compare L. HALL & S. GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
17 (1958) with Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
176, 181 (1952).
189. N. WALKER, supra note 60, at 71. See generally War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to
New Fronts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1984, at 63. In response to the nation's
amount of alcohol-related accidents almost every state has adopted stiffer penalties in their
drunken driving statutes.
190. War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, supra note 189, Dec. 24, 1984, at
63.
191. N. WALKER, supra note 193, at 71.
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similar to specific deterrence in that it is a deliberate threat of pun-
ishment aimed at discouraging criminal conduct.19 Under this the-
ory, however, the punishment of a criminal offender is designed to
deter not only the individual but also potential offenders in the com-
munity.19 Thus, general deterrence is concerned more with deterring
society in general than with deterring the individual offender.19' Ac-
cording to this theory, society must punish offenders in order to set
an example that deters others from acting in a similar manner.
Scarlet letter sentences provide such a deterrent to society, be-
cause those that see signs attached to convicted persons become
aware that these crimes are being punished and that there is a
stigma attached to criminal behavior. Such sentences encourage po-
tential offenders who see the signs to contemplate their fate before
acting and to reject a criminal career in order to escape punishment
and humiliation. Indeed, witnessing or hearing about such warning
signs may have a sobering effect when persons in the community
consider the ramifications of having such a stigma attached to them-
selves. Such signs may make work, home and friends more difficult
to obtain. "The deterrent effect of punishment is heightened if it in-
flicts disgrace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular man-
ner."' 95 If one is aware that simply paying a fine or serving some
discrete time in a prison will not necessarily be the punishment for
criminal behavior, people may be forced to consider such ramifica-
tions of anti-social behavior. To avoid such consequences, the public
must actively choose a law-abiding lifestyle. It is much more difficult
for the public to dismiss the consequences of criminal behavior if an
offender is publicly paying his penance within the community rather
than if that person was sent away to prison. The sentence not only
serves to remind the community of the severity of the offense on the
day of sentencing but also serves as a reminder each day that sen-
tence is served.
(c). Rehabilitation.-The theory of rehabilitation focuses
on providing the offender with appropriate treatment in order to
modify his anti-social behavior into acceptable conduct.' 6 It empha-
sizes the changing of conduct of the individual offender. 97 In actual-
192. Id. See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5.
193. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5.
194. Id.
195. United States v. Williams Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1983).
196. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTw, supra note 12, at § 1.5(a)(3).
197. Id.
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ity, it is not entirely correct to refer to rehabilitation as "punish-
ment." The emphasis on rehabilitation is not upon causing the
malefactor to suffer for his crime but rather upon improving the of-
fender's behavior. 198 Successful rehabilitation of a defendant re-
quires that sentences be tailored to fit the offender rather than the
offense. 199 "Punishment, therefore, is justified under this theory only
so far as the sentence will reform the individual into a productive
member of society."2 '
Warning signs act as a "Pavlovian" behavior modification tech-
nique.20' Each time the offender encounters the sign, he is cognizant
of his activity and the illegality of that behavior. 2  The sign rein-
forces upon the offender that this behavior is unacceptable and will
result in punitive treatment and stigma. The offender is also aware
of society's determination to see this behavior condemned. Thus,
should the defendant contemplate reviving a criminal lifestyle, the
sign reminds the probationer of the humiliation and social degrada-
tion associated with the criminal behavior. It repels the offender
from committing unacceptable conduct and causes instead lawful
behavior.
(d). Education.-Under the theory of education, criminal
punishment serves to educate the public as to what behavior is ac-
ceptable and what is intolerable.20 Trial and conviction, as well as
the actual punishment, publicize the distinctions between tolerable
and intolerable behavior.20 4 While some crimes, such as murder and
rape, are generally known to the public as serious offenses, °2  crimes
such as drunken driving and prostitution, as well as other sexual of-
198. Id.
199. N. WALKER, supra note 185, at 62; see also R. GERBER. CONTEMPORARY PUNISH-
MENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS 175-77 (1972).
200. N. WALKER, supra note 185, at 62.
201. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), citing Brief
for Appellee, Goldschmitt, supra note 90, at 6. See also United States v. Carston, 562 F.
Supp. 181 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In Carston, the defendant was convicted of tax evasion and
sentenced to teach the use of computers to probationers and parolees. The court noted that by
association with street criminals, the defendant would be "constantly reminded that his con-
duct was legally and socially wrong." Id. at 185.
202. Transcript of Proceedings, Goldschmitt, supra note 90, at 7.
The Court: It may make you angry. It may subject you to some humilia-
tion, but while you have to display it, hopefully you will be learning and taking
to heart everything you learned in the DUI Counteraction School that you're not
supposed to drink to excess and drive a vehicle.
Id.
203. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5(a)(5).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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fenses, may not always be understood or even opposed by the general
public. The public often underestimates the gravity of these crimes,
as is evidenced by the high rate of offense in these areas.20 6 Scarlet
letter sentencing is particularly effective in alerting the public to the
seriousness of these offenses.
Warning signs may educate the public about the criminality of
certain behavior, as well as the consequences entailed should the of-
fensive behavior be detected. Many Americans are unaware of the
penalties that certain offenses carry and therefore may disregard the
possibility of arrest should their criminal behavior continue. Scarlet
letter sentencing, however, forces the public to recognize that crimi-
nal laws are being enforced and encourages private citizens to police
their own activity.
The signs, therefore, are a form of community service. They
serve as a reminder that illegal activities will be condemned and
publicly prosecuted. This, in turn, instills faith in our criminal justice
system.
(e). Incapacitation.-Under the theory of incapacitation,
the offender is restrained in the interest of protecting society from
those "persons deemed dangerous because of their past criminal con-
duct."2 7 Institutionalizing an offender is the obvious milieu for re-
straint, but as penal institutions become overcrowded and costly, so-
ciety must develop efficient alternatives.20 8 Incapacitation does not
always necessitate the use of prisons. It involves only the act of re-
straint, be it physical, legal or moral.
In the cases offered earlier as illustration, the judges ordered the
use of warning signs as a term of probation. These terms, however,
were not the only conditions imposed. Each judge designed an indi-
vidualized program with several mandatory conditions to provide for
the restraint of the individual.20
Bateman, the convicted child molester, was not permitted to
enter any parks, zoos or areas that children may frequent.21 0 Fur-
thermore, he was not allowed within a ten-block radius of his previ-
ous address, nor to associate or communicate in any way with a child
below the age of eighteen.211 This type of sentencing program pro-
206. Id.
207. Id. at § 1.5(a)(2).
208. Id.
209. See Brief for Appellant, Bateman, supra note 107, at 6-7; Transcript of Proceed-
ings, Goldschmitt, supra, note 90, at 4.
210. Brief for Appellant, Bateman, supra note 107, at 6.
211. Id.
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vides for the restraint of the offender without a large economic bur-
den on the American public, while also providing for the safety of
the community. Although such a program may not be appropriate
for a high risk offender,212 scarlet letter programs such as illustrated
here provide an effective alternative for low-to-middle-risk 13
offenders.
(P. Retribution.-The goal of retribution is premised
upon the theory that "the primary justification of punishment is al-
ways to be found in the fact that an offense has been committed
which deserves punishment, not in any future advantage to be gained
by its infliction. 2 " The gravity of the offense committed determines
the degree of suffering that ought to be imposed on the offender.21 5
The oft-quoted biblical phrase "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth" best exemplifies the reasoning behind the goal of
retribution.21
While the offenders in the Goldschmitt and Bateman cases had
the choice of completing jail time or abiding by the challenged pro-
bation conditions, either alternative provides a form of retribution.
Neither path enables the defendants to escape punishment. The scar-
let letter sentence is, in effect, a degrading experience. Society is
privy to the suffering of the offender. For an offender such as Bate-
man, who sexually abused and traumatized young children, this sen-
tence is particularly appropriate. It allows the sex offender to feel
disgrace and humiliation similar to that felt by a sexual abuse vic-
tim. In effect, he too becomes stigmatized in the community. Partic-
ularly in this example, the scarlet letter sentence truly represents "an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
IV. The Right of Society to be Protected
Society has a right to be protected from an imminent harm or
danger.21 That right justifies identifying and controlling those per-
sons who pose a threat to society.21 8 This social defense justification
requires that penologists predict which persons pose a threat to soci-
212. High risk offenders are those criminals, such as murderers and violent rapists, who
pose a serious threat to the public's well-being.
213. Low-to-middle-risk offenders include all persons who commit non-violent crimes.
"Low risk" designates criminals such as drunk drivers, thieves and white-collar criminals.
214. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at § 1.5(a)(6).
215. Id.
216. See R. GERBER, supra note 13, at 39.
217. See id. at 129.
218. See id.
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ety and the degree of that threat. 1 9
Incarceration is often accepted as the best means for insuring
that society's right to be protected is not violated. Alternative
sentences have partially grown out of courts' recognition that prison
overcrowding and resulting early releases undermine the ability of a
prison sentence to insure that protection.220 Such judges feel they
have no choice but to design alternatives to traditional prison
sentences.221 For example, in the Bateman case, the sentencing judge
estimated that the defendant, had he been sentenced to prison, would
have been paroled within a few weeks for a felony that could have
brought him a ten year term under the statutory sentencing scheme
in Oregon.2 2
The American Civil Liberties Union has argued that alternative
punishments are a needless and ineffective imposition of suffering, in
that the class of persons at which these sanctions are aimed may be
unable to read these signs.223
Thus, the organization argues that such sentences do not further
society's right to protection. Such a conclusion, however, is too nar-
rowly drawn. While there may be incidents when a child is both un-
supervised and unable to read or the offender is not in his house or
by his car where the signs are posted. Many potential child victims
will be able to read the signs or will be with an adult who will recog-
nize the danger. In the alternative, the offender may be unsure as to
whether the child is illiterate, and that doubt will therefore discour-
age him from engaging in the offensive behavior.
In any event, such signs will make it more difficult for sexual
molesters to repeat their criminal behavior and penologists contend
that the prevention of just one case of molestation justifies this
method of punishment."2 4 In fact, of the three separate offenses that
were committed by the Bateman defendant, two could have been
prevented by these signs. In those instances, an adult or child capa-
ble of reading left the victim in the sole custody of the defendant. In
all three cases, the defendant molested the children in his home. Had
the signs been posted on Bateman's home at the time of the offenses,
in all likelihood the children would not have been left with Bateman
219. Id. at 129-30.
220. Silverman, supra note 15, at 8.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union at 5, State v. Bate-
man, No. A 44854 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
224. Silverman, supra note 15, at 8.
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and the molestations would have not occurred.
Alternative sentences also protect society when the defendant is
a drunk driver. Statistics reveal that almost fifty percent of all
deaths occurring on our roadways are alcohol-related.221 5 Every
twenty minutes marks the occurrence of an alcohol-related death.226
Legislatures and courts have been unsuccessful in their attempt to
significantly curtail these accidents by simply mandating stiffer
penalties. 2
In Goldschmitt, the two judges implemented their bumper
sticker program in an attempt to protect society from this prevalent
danger. Since then, the Ohio legislature also has opted for a similar
program.22s These devices alert other drivers to drive defensively and
warn potential passengers that it may not be safe to accept rides
from these marked drivers.
These programs have been criticized as allowing convicted
drunk drivers to regain their drivers' license after they have been
found to be a danger to the public. 229 Although a period of license
suspension may be effective in keeping a drunken driver off the road,
license suspension may cause socio-economic problems which could
far outweigh or exacerbate the possibility of alcohol abuse by a one-
time offender. Without a driver's license, it may be difficult for the
offender to maintain a job or attend the alcohol treatment or com-
munity service programs that the court may have mandated as a
part of sentencing disposition. By allowing the offender to maintain
his license for business purposes, he is less likely to violate his proba-
tion conditions or experience financial disaster.
V. Legislative Action
While scarlet letter sentencings provide less restrictive alterna-
tives to incarceration while still protecting society, legislatures on the
state and federal level must provide detailed guidelines as to what
225. B. LANDSTREET, THE DRINKING DRIVER: THE ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PRO-
GRAMS 3 (1977).
226. Id.
227. See War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 24, 1984, at 63. See also Note, supra note 186, at 643 (1988). "In response to the
nation's drunken driving problem, almost every state has adopted new drunk driving statutes
which mandate stiffer penalties for offenders." Id. Many of the new state drunk driving laws
require prison sentences or community service work and heavier fines. Id. For example, the
Rhode Island drunk driving statute requires an offender convicted of drunk driving to fulfill
either ten to sixty hours of community service or a jail sentence of up to one year. R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1987).
228. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4503.231 (Baldwin 1984) supra note 4.
229. See Note, supra note 186, at 643.
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alternatives may be implemented and who may be a candidate for
these programs. Certainly, legislatures alone cannot guarantee that
these sentences will survive constitutional attack, but their debates
and input will help to overcome problems of inequity. County to
county, the same crime thus will have the same list of alternatives to
incarceration, from which the sentencing judge may still employ his
discretion in choosing from the list. Such legislation effectively pro-
vides for the equities and economic considerations of determinate
sentencing structures and also allows for the individualized sentenc-
ing provided in indeterminate sentencing structures.
Many states still declare that "any term of probation is accept-
able if it is reasonably related to a rehabilitative purpose."23 Such a
standard may have been sufficient when incarceration was the pri-
mary form of punishment. As a result of an increased reliance upon
probation and the influx of more hardened criminals into the proba-
tion system in response to prison overcrowding, a more defined struc-
ture is now necessary.
The American Bar Association has prepared recommendations
to legislators pertaining to criteria that should be developed into sen-
tencing guidelines for judges.231 The A.B.A. has recognized that "the
subject of sentencing has in so many ways, been treated in a manner
which is not commensurate with its importance." '232 In its report, the
Committee de-emphasized confinement and stressed innovative
forms of sentencing which would provide the least restrictive alterna-
tives to incarceration." 3
The Committee made two specific recommendations for those
legislatures dealing with alternatives for the sentencing court. First,
courts responsible for sentencing "should be provided in all cases
with a wide range of alternatives, with gradations of supervisory,
supportive and custodial facilities at its disposal so as to permit a
sentence appropriate for each individual case."234 Therefore, legisla-
tures should develop a system such as that which follows:
23 5
230. See, e.g., State v. Asher, 40 Or. App. 455, 595 P.2d 839 (1979).
231. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 337 (1974). See also Johnson, Frustration: The Mold of Judicial Philoso-
phy, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84/85, 214, 214-18.
232. Id. at 339. See also Johnson, supra note 231, at 216.
233. Id. at 343. See also Johnson, supra note 231, at 216.
234. Id. at 351.
235. See O'Leary, Reshaping Community Corrections, 31 CRIME AND DELIQUENCY 357
(1985).
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Degree of Risk Acceptable Programs
High Risk Maximum Security Prison
Medium Security Prison
Minimum Security Prison
Middle Risk Local Correctional Facility
Halfway House
Home Detention
Middle-Low Risk Scarlet Letter sentence coupled
with a low-risk sentence
Intensive Supervision Probation
Low Risk Community Service/Restitution
Earn-it Programs
As suggested by the above diagram, scarlet letter sentencing should
be statutorily provided as an alternative sentence for middle-low risk
offenders. Further, judges should be provided the discretion to com-
bine these alternatives when appropriate, so that a scarlet letter sen-
tence may be coupled with a term of probation, parole or community
service, or whatever the judge deems suited to the individual needs
and risk of the defendant.
In addition, the A.B.A. also recommends that legislative bodies
"should authorize the sentencing court in every case to impose a sen-
tence of probation or a similar sentence not involving confine-
ment."' 3 Thus, the organization suggests a broadening of judicial
discretion in the imposition of sentencing, which permits individual
tailoring in sentencing.
It is important to note that not all offenders are appropriate
candidates for scarlet letter sentences. A wife subjected to spousal
abuse, who kills her husband in an act of passion or self-defense, is
not an appropriate candidate for the scarlet letter sentence. There is
little reason to warn society of her once-violent behavior, because her
violence was focused upon one person, and she does not pose a threat
to society at large. On the other hand, a dangerous sex offender or
rapist poses a serious threat to society. These offenders have the
highest rate of recidivism because they are often not rehabilitated
after their first offense." 7 They are therefore less likely to restrain
236. Id. at 352. See also Johnson, supra note 231, at 216.
237. Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107, at Appendix C-7, citing Freeman-
Long & Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, March 1986, at
64. ("Most untreated sex offenders go on to commit more offenses - Indeed, as many as 80
percent do.") See also Brief for Appellee, Bateman, supra note 107, at 7:
The Court: It's their way of life. They seem to think it's their right to be
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their offensive behavior. If made aware of the existence of such
criminals in the community, members of society may act defensively
around such persons and prevent their own victimization.
VI. Conclusion
Scarlet letter-type sentences are one of the many intermediate
punishment programs that show great promise. They are less restric-
tive alternatives to incarceration and may reduce prison populations
without posing serious hazards to the safety of the general public.
The alternative to such sentences is unsatisfactory. As a result of
prison overcrowding, many first-time offenders, as well as repeat of-
fenders, are released with nothing more than a promise not to com-
mit another crime. Such treatment serves only to facilitate the of-
fender's opportunity to commit more crimes.
A scarlet letter program does not allow the offender or society
to forget the gravity of an offense quickly. It actually helps the of-
fender to reform, or at the very least, keeps the criminal from re-
peating an offense by placing society, as well as the police, on the
defense, and by ultimately making it more difficult for the defendant
to reoffend. Under such a sentencing scheme, society does not vul-
nerably await further victimization but takes instead precautionary
measures to ensure safety. Thus, the scarlet letter sentencing alter-
native is one such method that we may desire our legislatures to
make available to the courts.
Rosalind K. Kelley
able to engage in this behavior. Treatment is only successful during the period of
time that they are on treatment. If they are gone from treatment for two weeks,
they are back reoffending.
Id.
